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In this paper we look at the suitability of modern interval-based tem-
poral logic for modeling John Buridan’s treatment of tensed sentences in
his Sophismata. Building on the paper [Øhrstrøm 1984], we develop Buri-
dan’s analysis of temporal logic, paying particular attention to his notions
of negation and the absolute/relative nature of the future and the past.
We introduce a number of standard modern propositional interval tem-
poral logics (ITLs) to illustrate where Buridan’s interval-based temporal
analysis differs from the standard modern approaches. We give formal
proofs of some claims in [Øhrstrøm 1984], and sketch how the standard
modern systems could be defined in terms of Buridan’s proposals, showing
that his logic can be taken as more basic.
1 Introduction
The last forty years have seen the development of interval semantics for temporal
logics. The stimulus for this development has come from a number of diverse in-
tellectual fields. Philosophically, we can ask whether our analysis of time should
be “based on time periods rather than durationless instants” [Burgess 1982,
375]. In linguistics, interval based analyses of some natural language expres-
sions were proposed in [Reichenbach 1966, §51].1 Interval based temporal logics
have also found a number of applications in the fields of artificial intelligence and
computer science [Goranko et al. 2004], and they can also be used to provide
simpler models of certain problems in physics [van Benthem 1983, 58].
Approaching temporal and tensed statements from an interval-based, as op-
posed to a point-based, view-point is, however, not new to the 20th century.2 An
∗The first author was funded by the project “Dialogical Foundations of Semantics” (Di-
FoS) in the ESF EuroCoRes programme LogICCC (LogICCC-FP004; DN 231-80-002; CN
2008/08314/GW). The second author was funded by the University of Amsterdam, Amster-
dam Merit Scholarship.
1In Reichenbach’s three-part analysis of English tenses, the ‘event point’ E is not actually
a point but instead an interval or the duration of the event being referred to.
2The point-based analysis of temporal statements is, of course, not new to the 20th century
either; standard medieval analyses of sophisms involving incipit ‘begins’ and desinit ‘ceases’
involve point-based structures.
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interval-based approach to tensed natural language sentences can be found in
the works of John Buridan, a French logician writing in the first half of the 14th
century. Buridan’s approach to temporal logic as expressed in his Sophismata
has been developed previously in [Øhrstrøm 1984]. Øhrstrøm’s paper highlights
a number of important, and philosophically interesting, aspects of Buridan’s
logic, including Buridan’s definition of truth within a temporal interval [§1] and
a distinction Buridan draws between two different kinds of negation [§2].
Øhrstrøm’s paper serves as an excellent starting point for investigating Buri-
dan’s temporal logic, but it is, as the paper itself admits, merely an outline
of Buridan’s basic ideas. The paper contains only one reference to Buridan’s
actual work, and the logical formalism developed in the paper is done in a
fairly informal manner, with minimal reference to other literature on modern
interval temporal logics. While the basic ideas are partly expanded upon in
[Øhrstrøm et al. 1995], principally in [§§1.3, 1.5], Øhrstrøm’s and Hasle’s dis-
cussion there focuses on the material found in the Sophismata, without drawing
any connections between it and ideas discussed in Buridan’s other works, or be-
tween Buridan’s views and those found in modern discussion of interval-based
approaches, and their discussion this primarily from a syntactic point of view,
without mention of semantics.
Because of Buridan’s idiosyncratic approach to interval-based semantics for
temporal logic, and the interesting formal connections between his logic and
standard contemporary interval temporal logics, we believe that Buridan’s views
deserve a more thorough account, in particular paying attention to the semantic
side of modeling Buridan’s approach. Our goal in this paper is to build upon
Øhrstrøm’s work to clarify Buridan’s views and to make explicit how his logic
compares with contemporary interval temporal logics. First, in §2 we introduce
the reader to Buridan’s approach to temporal logic in the Sophismata, discussing
some specific sophisms to highlight special features of his analysis. In §3, we
show how the material in the Sophismata connects to related material in Buri-
dan’s other writings, specifically the Summulae de dialecticae [Buridan 2001]
and De consequentiis [Buridan 1976], to place his temporal analysis within the
context of his broader logical theory. We give in §4 a brief overview of the devel-
opment of interval semantics for temporal logic and discuss the various different
systems in the current literature so that in §5 we can develop Buridan’s account
of temporal logic within the framework of modern interval semantics and ap-
ply this formalism to some of the problems Buridan considers. Finally, in §6
we discuss the relevance of Buridan’s logic for modern temporal logic, and give
pointers to future work.
2 Interval-based analyses in the Sophismata
Buridan’s most important work is the Summulae de dialectica, edited in
[Buridan n.d.] and translated in [Buridan 2001], written for use as a textbook
while he was teaching at the University of Paris between the early 1320s and
1340. He also wrote a Sophismata, a work devoted to the analysis and reso-
lution of certain logical puzzles and paradoxes. The Sophismata is edited in
[Buridan 1977] and translated in [Buridan 2001]. Buridan’s reflections on time
and tense are found primarily in the seventh chapter of the Sophismata.
Buridan’s account of temporal reasoning in the Sophismata is based on rea-
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soning within an interval-based logic. The truth of a proposition is analyzed
with respect to the ‘present’, but in the Sophismata, words such as ‘present’,
‘past’ and ‘future’ all denote intervals of time. The exact length of the vari-
ous intervals is determined pragmatically. Buridan says in the first sophism of
Chapter 7:
Sed tu quaeres quantum est ergo tempus praesens cum non sit in-
stans indivisibile. . . Et ego dico non est nobis determinarum quantum
sit tempus praesens quo debeamus uti tanquam praesente. Sed licet
nobis uti quanto volumus, vocamus enim istum annum praesentem
et hanc diem praesentem et hanc horam praesentem. Et si hac die
utamur tanquam praesente, tunc hora prima est et hora meridiei est
et hora completorii est, sed successive [Buridan 1977, 113].3
Later he says, si in aliqua parte temporis praesentis Sortes stat vel est albus
vel est mortuus, verum est simpliciter dicere quod ipse stat vel est albus vel est
mortuus [Buridan 1977, 116].4 Thus, in his temporal logic, a sentence ϕ is true
within a given interval just in case it is true at some sub-interval of that interval.
That is, the proposition ‘Socrates is sitting’ is true just in case there is some
part of the present where Socrates is sitting. In other words, the exact range of
words like ‘present’ is a conventional issue that is to be taken from the context
in which the expression is used.
This definition of truth in an interval gives rise to a number of sophisms that
Buridan needs to consider, to ensure that his definition of ‘true in an interval’
is not paradoxical. By considering these two sophisms we will gain a better
understanding of Buridan’s conception of the various intervals and how this
affects his views of negation.
The first sophism deals with the issue of taking the present interval to be
as long or as short as we desire. Let ϕ := ‘Aristotle argues’ and ψ := ‘the
Antichrist preaches’. Assume, as Buridan did, that the Antichrist will at some
point in the future preach, and consider the conjunction ϕ ∧ ψ. Is it true? A
näıve reaction would be that this conjunction should be seen to be false, since
Aristotle is dead, and the Antichrist has yet to preach. However, Buridan says:
Probo quia dictum est quod nobis licitum est uti pro tempore prae-
senti quantocumque tempore volumus. . .Respondeo quod sophisma
est concedendum in casu in quo tanto tempore volumus uti tanquam
praesente quod rationabiliter possumus facere sicut bene arguebatur.
Sed quoniam verum est quod nos loquentes communiter de nostris
factis quotidianis non solemus uti magno tempore tanquam prae-
sente, sed parvo. . .Tamen ratione utentes et uti volentes tanto tem-
pore tanquam praesente, debemus concedere sophisma et dicere etiam
quod Aristotle est mortuus et quod ipse est vivus [Buridan 1977, 117–
18].5
3“But then you ask: ‘How long is the present time, since there is no indivisible in-
stance?’. . . And I say that it is not determined for us how much time we ought to use as
the present, but we may use as much as we want. For we call this year the present, and this
day the present, and this hour the present, and if we use this day as the present, then the first
hour is, and noon hour is, and the vesper hour is, but successively” [Buridan 2001, 941–42].
4“if during some part of the present time, Socrates is standing or is white or is dead, it
is true to say without qualification that he is standing or is white or is dead” [Buridan 2001,
945].
5“It has been said that we can use as the present as long a time as we wish. . . I respond
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Buridan argues that the conjunction is true as long as the temporal interval
for the present is large enough to encompass a time when Aristotle argues and
the Antichrist preaches. The oddness of this conclusion is due to the fact that
nos loquentes communiter de nostris factis quotidianus non solemus uti magno
tempore tanquam praesente, sed parvo. In more modern terms, Buridan’s re-
sponse is that, pragmatically, this sophism represents an abuse of the normal
conventions governing the use of the word ‘present’; however when ‘present’ is
understood as the sophism requires, the argument is technically true.
The second sophism is the following: First, assume that within some day
Socrates sits for a period of time and stands for the rest of it. Let the present
range over this day. Now let ϕ denote the proposition ‘Socrates is sitting’. It
follows that ϕ is true, since there is some sub-interval of the present where
Socrates is sitting. However, there is also a sub-interval where ϕ is false. But
then it follows that Socrates is sitting and Socrates isn’t sitting, which is a
contradiction (cf. [Buridan 2001, 944]). To this paradox, Buridan replies that
Dico breviter quod haec est vera: ‘Sortes sedet et Sortes stat’ et
‘Sortes est sedens et Sortes est non sedens’ sicut bene probatur [Buridan 1977,
115].6
However, from this Buridan argues that the inference to ‘Socrates isn’t sitting’
is false:
‘Quando Sortes stat, ipse non sedet’, quia ibi accipitur ‘quando’ in-
definite et sic illa propositio valet istam: ‘In aliquo tempore Sortes
stat in quo tempore non sedet’. Et hoc est verum. Sed haec est ne-
ganda: ‘Quandocumque Sortes stat, ipse non sedet’, quia valet istam
‘omni tempore in quo Sortes stat in illo non sedet’. Et hoc falsum in
casu in quo utimur toto tempore tanquam praesente et quod in prima
eius medietate stat et in secunda sed, quia est quoddam tempus in
quo sedet et stat. Unde non sequitur: stat ergo non sedet. . . equus
est mortuus ergo non est vivus [Buridan 1977, 116].7
Buridan’s response is motivated by how negation distributes a proposition over
an interval. The affirmative proposition ‘Socrates is non-sitting’ is true in the
present if it is true in some sub-interval of the present, and hence it doesn’t
that the sophism [This conjunction is true: ‘Aristotle argues and Antichrist preaches’] is to
be conceded in the case in which we wish to use such a long time as the present and we can
reasonably do so, as has been correctly argued. But it is true that when we commonly speak
about our everyday dealings, we usually do not use a long time as the present, but a short
one. . . if we follow the argument however, and we wish to use such a long time as the present,
we have to concede the sophism and also have to say both that Aristotle is dead, and that he
is alive” [Buridan 2001, 942].
6“ ‘Socrates is sitting and Socrates is standing’, [is true] and so is this: ‘Socrates is sitting
and Socrates is non-sitting’ as has been correctly proven” [Buridan 2001, 945].
7“I would easily concede this: ‘when Socrates is standing, he is not sitting’ for ‘when’
is taken here indefinitely, and so this proposition is equivalent to, ‘At some time, Socrates
is standing at which he is not sitting’ and this is true. But the following is to be denied:
‘whenever Socrates is standing, he is not sitting’ for this is equivalent to ‘At every time at
which Socrates is standing, he is not sitting’ and this is false in a case in which an entire time
C would be used as the present, and in the first half of it, he would be standing and in the
second he would be sitting, for C would be a time at which he would be sitting and standing.
Therefore this is not valid: ‘ is standing; therefore is not sitting’. . . or ‘A
horse is dead; therefore it not alive.” [Buridan 2001, 945].
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distribute over the entire present, whereas the negative proposition ‘Socrates
isn’t sitting’ distributes over the entire present, in that it is true of an interval
if and only if it is true of all sub-intervals. Hence, Buridan can conclude that
the inference is invalid:
[I]n affirmativa verbum quantum ad tempus quod consignificat ac-
cipitur indefinite. . . Sed in negativa verbum quantum ad tempus con-
significatum distribuitur. Ideo si pro aliqua parte temporis praesen-
tis aliquis sedet vel est niger. . . istae sunt falsae, quia ille non sedet
vel non est niger. . . Sicut etiam propter divisibilitatem futuri verum
est quod A stabit et quod A sedebit, quod erit album et erit nigrum
[Buridan 1977, 116].8
Thus, Buridan is committed to saying et dicere etiam quod Aristoteles est mor-
tuus et quod ipse est vivus et ita de Antichristo.9 This demonstrates that Buri-
dan understands his temporal logic as having two different types of negation (cf.
[Øhrstrøm 1984, §2]), external negation and internal negation, corresponding to
the Aristotelian distinction between sentence negation and term negation. The
external negation which occurs in negative propositions such as ϕ :=‘Socrates
isn’t sitting’ ranges over the entire interval: For ϕ to be true at a given interval
I, there must be no sub-interval in which Socrates is sitting. In contrast, the
internal negation which occurs in affirmative propositions such as ψ :=‘Socrates
is non-sitting’, does not distribute: For ψ to be true, there just needs to be
some sub-interval at which Socrates isn’t sitting. By drawing this distinction,
Buridan is able to block the inference from ‘Socrates is non-sitting’ to ‘It is not
the case that Socrates is sitting’.
The second interesting feature of Buridan’s temporal logic is his introduction
of both relative and absolute times. In the eighth sophism of Chapter 7, Buridan
addresses a problem arising from a claim in Aristotle. Aristotle argues in Physics
VI.6.236b32–34 that “whatever moves moved earlier”. However, using Buridan’s
temporal analysis, it is possible to construct the following counterargument:
Oppositum arguitur per priorem nostram determinationem quia si
utamur hac tota die tanquam praesente,. . . Ponamus ergo quod A
nunquam fuit ante istam diem, immo hora prima generabatur, et
etiam non erit post istam diem, immo hora vesperorum corrum-
petur; et in hora meridiei movetur. Apparet quod A movetur et
tamen nunquam movebatur neque movebitur, quia ipsum nunquam
fuit et nunquam erit, quia per casum in nullo tempore praeterito
fuit, et tamen non fuit nisi in tempore praeterito fuerit. Et eodem
modo argueretur si quantocumque tempore parvo uteremur tanquam
praesente, ponendo quod A praecise in illo parvo tempore moveretur
[Buridan 1977, 120].10
8“[I]n an affirmative [proposition] the verb is taken indefinitely with respect to the con-
signified time. . . But in a negative [proposition] the verb is distributed with respect to the con-
signified time; therefore, if during some part of that time someone is sitting or is black. . . the
propositions asserting that he is not sitting, or is not black. . . are false. Similarly because of
the divisibility of the future it is true that A will be sitting and will be standing, that A will
be white and A will be black” [Buridan 2001, 945].
9“both that Aristotle is dead, and that he is alive and the same goes for Antichrist. . . ”
[Buridan 2001, 946]
10“The opposite is argued on the basis of our earlier determination. For if we use this whole
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Buridan’s response to this supposed counterexample is to argue that
quod ista nomina ‘praeteritum’ et ‘futurum’ supponentia pro tempo-
ribus capi solent aliquando simpliciter et absolute et aliquando re-
spective. Si ergo capiantur absolute, tunc nulla pars temporis qua
utimur tanquam praesente dicenda est praeterita vel futura. . .Aliter
accipiuntur ‘praeteritum’ et ‘futurum’ respective, ita quod praesen-
tis temporis pars prior vocatur praeterita respectu posterioris et pars
posterior futura respectu prioris [Buridan 1977, 120].11
Buridan uses this distinction to say that if the past and present are understood
absolutely, then Aristotle’s claim is false, and the sophism is correctly proven.
However, the relative reading allows for Aristotle’s claim to remain true, since
we consider not only the past and present relative to the current day, but we
also consider the various parts of the current day.
3 Tensed propositions in Buridan’s other works
While Buridan does discuss time and tense in the Summulae, the distinctly
interval-based analysis is not explicitly developed. Instead, Buridan discusses
a number of questions revolving around the signification of temporal proposi-
tions and the supposition of the terms therein. The most explicit discussion of
time in the Summulae is found in Buridan’s analysis of ‘when’-questions, in his
discussion of the Aristotelian categories in treatise 3. He says:
Aliquando etiam respondemus ad ‘quando?’ non per talia aduerbia,
sed per nomina declinabilia. . . Et omnia huius modi praedicata perti-
nent ad hoc praedicamentum, ut ‘hodie’. . . et ‘heri’ uel ‘cras’. . .Re-
spondeo quod significant uel connotant certa tempora et distantia
eorum ad praesens. . . [Buridan n.d.].12
This hardly supports an interval approach to temporal analysis.
De consequentiis contains a more explicit discussion of the analysis of tensed
propositions, including their truth conditions, but the analysis is at a fairly su-
perficial level. A present-tensed statement is true quia qualitercumque ipsa sig-
nificat ita est, scilicet in re significata in uel in rebus significatis [Buridan 1976,
17]13. A future-tensed sentence, such as Antichristus praedicabit, is true quia
ita erit in re sicut propositio significat fore [Buridan 1976, 17]14, and similarly
day as the present. . . Let us therefore posit that A never existed before today—indeed it is
generated in the first hour—and that it will not exist after today, but it is destroyed in the
vesper hour and it moves in the noon hour. Then it seems that A moves but never moved nor
will move for it never was or will be” [Buridan 2001, 949].
11“the names ‘past’ and ‘present’, which supposit for time, are sometimes taken simply and
absolutely, sometimes relatively. If they are taken absolutely then no part of the time that
we use as the present should be called past or future. . . In the other way ‘past’ and ‘present’
are taken relatively so that an earlier part of the present time is past relative to a later part
[Buridan 2001, 949–50].
12“Sometimes we also respond to the question When? not by such adverbs but de-
clinable words. . . And all such predicates pertain to this category, for example ‘to-
day. . . yesterday/tomorrow’. . . I reply that they signify or connote certain times and their
distances from the present. . . ” [Buridan 2001, 201].
13“because however it signifies is the case, namely in the thing or things signified.”
14“because it will be the case just as the proposition signifies it will be”.
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for past tensed sentences. But there is no discussion of what the nature of the
present, past, and future are, or how the consequences that this has on the truth
conditions for tensed propositions, and our evaluation of them.
We argue that this suggests that Buridan’s temporal analysis in the Sophis-
mata is highly pragmatic in nature. Buridan developed this particular analysis
of time because it allows him to effectively deal with a number of problems
that emerged in the treatment of tensed expressions. This appeal to prag-
matic or conventional features of linguistic discourse to provide a basis for a
logico-philosophical theory is one of the hall-marks of Buridan’s approach to
philosophy and philosophical logic. As Zupko says, “No one before Buridan
placed so much of an emphasis on the conventional meaning as a way of both
shaping philosophical inquiry and indicating its limits” [Zupko 2003, 22].
Buridan’s temporal logic can be contrasted with various modern approaches
which attempt to analyze time as a set of ‘instants’. The choice of an interval-
based temporal logic, as opposed to an instant-based one, has important conse-
quences both formally and philosophically, as we will show in this paper (cf. also
[Øhrstrøm et al. 1995]). Additionally, from a formal point of view, Buridan’s
interval-based approach, as Øhrstrøm notes in [Øhrstrøm 1984, 211], does not
require that ϕ be true at every sub-interval of an interval for it to be true in the
interval, in contrast with standard modern approaches to interval semantics for
temporal logic. We discuss this and related issues in §4 and §5.
From these observations, it is clear that Buridan’s temporal logic possesses
a number of interesting features connected to the pragmatic nature of ‘the
present’, the distinction between two types of negation, and the absolute vs.
relative nature of time. The various features of Buridan’s logic, namely its defi-
nition of truth, the distinction between two types of negation, and the pragmatic
features of the logic invite a modern analysis of what exactly is going on. In the
next section we introduce modern formal techniques which will allow us to give
an analysis of Buridan’s temporal logic in §5.
4 Interval semantics for temporal logics
As we saw in the previous section, the temporal logic that Buridan develops
invites formulation using modern interval semantics. In this section we in-
troduce interval semantics, with an eye to capturing the various distinctions
that Buridan draws, as well as looking at how his logic relates to modern
interval based temporal logics. We will only highlight those temporal logics
based on interval semantics which will have an application in the next section.
For a more complete overview of modern applications of interval semantics see
[Goranko et al. 2004] and the references there.
Given a strict partial order D = 〈D,<〉, such as the natural numbers or the
real numbers with the usual ordering relation, we define an interval in D as a
pair [d0, d1] such that d0, d1 ∈ D and d0 ≤ d1 (that is, we restrict our attention
to closed intervals). (We will often write Id0,d1 for the interval [d0, d1].) The
set of intervals over a partial order D is designated I(D). An interval is called
strict iff d1 < d2 and a point or instant iff d1 = d2. Further, if d ∈ [d1, d2], then
d1 ≤ d ≤ d2. Given this definition of interval, it is straightforward to define the
subset relation:
[dn, dm] ⊆ [dk, dl] ⇔ ∀d ∈ [dn, dm], dk ≤ d ≤ dl
7
In other words, one interval is contained in another one just in case all of the
points in the first interval are also in the second. An interval structure is a
pair D = 〈D, I(D)〉. There are a number of properties that we might wish to
require of our interval structures, such as linearity, density, discreteness, and
unboundedness (both above and below); for mathematical definitions of these,
see [Goranko et al. 2004, 4–5].
A number of interesting logical systems have been developed to provide
analyses of various temporal phenomena. However, for our purposes, we only
considered propositional interval temporal logics (ITL). One early ITL was de-
veloped in [Burgess 1982]. Burgess takes as his model strict partial orders,
and defines strict and non-strict intervals as above.15 Given this definition
of interval, Burgess defines “the natural order relation induced by ≤, namely
[d0, d1] / [d2, d3] iff d1 ≤ d2” [375].
An interval structure D becomes a model M with the introduction of a val-
uation function, V . Burgess considers only valuations that are homogeneous.
A valuation function is homogeneous if on this valuation all sentences are ho-
mogeneous. A sentence is homogeneous if it is both persistent (or distributive)
and cumulative:16
Definition 4.1. A sentence ϕ is called persistent if it is true over an interval
only if it is true in every subinterval.
Definition 4.2. A sentence ϕ is called cumulative if it is true over two over-
lapping or abutting intervals only if it is true over the sum of the two intervals.
If V is homogeneous, then Burgess extends V to a valuation for complex
formulas defined as follows, where a, b, c range over intervals [Burgess 1982, 379]:
V (ϕ ∧ ψ) = V (ϕ) ∩ V (ψ)
V (¬ϕ) = {a : ∀b ⊆ a(b 6∈ V (ϕ))}
V (Gϕ) = {a : ∀b, c((b ⊆ a ∧ b / c) → c ∈ V (ϕ))}
V (Hϕ) = {a : ∀b, c((b ⊆ a ∧ c / b) → c ∈ V (ϕ))}
(The operators F and P are defined as ¬G¬ and ¬H¬, respectively.) From
these and the ordering definitions, Burgess introduces an axiomatization for ITL
which he proves is sound and complete [Burgess 1982, 380–82]:
(A1) G(p ⊃ q) ⊃ (G p ⊃ G q)
(A2) PG p ⊃ p
(A3) G p ⊃ GG p
(A4) F p ∨ F q ⊃ F(p ∨ F q) ∧ F(p ∨ q) ∧ F(F p ∨ q)
(A5) G p→ p
Burgess built his formalization on that given in [Röper 1980], where Röper
develops a non-homogeneous temporal logic. A non-homogeneous temporal logic
is one in which at least one sentence is not homogeneous. It should be clear
15Note that Burgess uses the topological expression ‘open interval’ for what we call a strict
interval and ‘closed interval’ for a non-strict interval.
16[Röper 1980, 451]. Röper takes this terminology from Humberstone, whose
[Humberstone 1979] formed the basis for [Röper 1980]. These natural language conditions
correspond to the formal definitions in [Burgess 1982, 377].
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from the preceding section that while sentences in Buridan’s temporal logic are
cumulative, they are not persistent, and thus we need a logic which is non-
homogeneous. However, as Röper notes [Röper 1980, 459–460], even if we have
a non-homogeneous logic, we still may want to be able to form a homogeneous
sentences from an arbitrary non-homogeneous sentences. To do this, Röper adds
the operation O such that “Oϕ is true over an interval x iff ϕ is true for some
subinterval z of every subinterval y of x”, formally:
M, [d1, d2] |= Oϕ iff ∀[d3, d4] ⊆ [d1, d2], ∃[d5, d6], M, [d5, d6] |= ϕ
As Röper develops his formalism, he notices a ‘problem’ with negation:
[I]t is appropriate to let the negation of a sentence be true for an
interval just when that sentence itself is not true for the interval.
With negation so defined it can happen that both Oα and O¬α
are true over some interval x; namely in a case in which for every
subinterval y of x there is a subinterval z of y for which α is true
and also a subinterval z′ for which ¬α is true. . . Although there is no
actual contradiction involved in the joint truth of Oα and O¬α, the
motivation for introducing O, as a kind of smoothing out operation,
would lead one to regard Oϕ and O¬ϕ as contraries. Also there
seems to be no reason to think that anything that goes on in time
and that we might want to describe would have periods of truth and
falsehood indefinitely finely intermingled” [Röper 1980, 10].
What Röper has noticed is the same problem that Buridan encountered in
sophism 4. Buridan’s analysis of sophisms 4–6 suggests that there are in fact
situations where it is desirable for the sentence Oϕ∧O¬ϕ to be true. However,
unlike Buridan, Röper dismisses the possibility that there may be a situation
where this type of behavior is desirable. He wishes to block the possibility of
Oϕ ∧O¬ϕ being true, and does so by making the following assumption:
For any interval x there exists a subinterval y such that either α
is true for all subintervals of y or α is true for no subinterval of y,
where α is any sentence [Röper 1980, 460].
This unfortunate move has the effect of essentially building homogeneity back
into the logic, a move which we cannot accept if we wish to accurately model
Buridan’s temporal analyses in the Sophismata.
We have now seen two simple ITLs, both of which have characteristics which
prevent us from using them to model Buridan’s temporal ideas. This is due
to the different truth conditions between standard modern ITLs, whose truth
conditions do not give the proper truth conditions for the sentence Oϕ∧O¬ϕ,
which, as we saw in §2, is an important aspect of his treatment of sophism 4, and
Buridan’s ITL. This means that we cannot use either of these simple logics as the
basis for our formal model of Buridan’s temporal theory. Instead, we modify and
extend an ITL called HS (for Halpern and Shoham, who first investigated the
logic, in [Halpern et al. 1991]). HS is the most expressive propositional interval
logic with unary modal operators [Goranko et al. 2004, 17], which makes it a
natural foundation on which to develop a model for Buridan’s temporal logic.
A number of results, including completeness and complexity, for HS are known
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for HS (cf. [Venema 1990]); while we do not show how these results can be
adapted to apply to our modified version of HS in this paper, we intend to do
so in future work.
In HS, we have two modal operators 〈B〉 and 〈E〉, corresponding to the
relations “begins” and “ends”, as well as their inverses, 〈B̄〉 and 〈Ē〉. The truth
conditions for these operators are defined as follows:
M, Ia,b |= 〈B〉ϕ iff ∃c, a ≤ c < b, M, Ia,c |= ϕ
M, Ia,b |= 〈E〉ϕ iff ∃c, a < c ≤ b, M, Ic,b |= ϕ
M, Ia,b |= 〈B̄〉ϕ iff ∃c > b, M, Ia,c |= ϕ
M, Ia,b |= 〈Ē〉ϕ iff ∃c < b, M, Ic,b |= ϕ
In HS we can also define a constant π which is true only in point intervals:
M, Ia,b |= π iff a = b
We will use π in the next section when we define the truth conditions of Buri-
dan’s tense operators.
5 Application
As in the previous section, we take as models pairs M = 〈D, V 〉, where D =
〈R,≤〉, with ≤ being the normal ‘less then’ ordering on R. We define ‘interval’
and ⊆ as in the previous section, and let I(M) be the set of intervals in M.
Truth is defined relative to a model and an interval in the model.17 When
no confusion will result, we’ll drop mention of M, and speak of the truth of
formulas with respect to arbitrary intervals. Additionally, when M, I |= ϕ for
every I ∈ I(M), we will omit reference to I and just write M |= ϕ. The truth
conditions for the two types of negation used by Buridan are as follows:
M, Ia,b |= p iff ∃Ic,d ⊆ Ia,b, Ic,d ∈ V (p)
M, Ia,b |= p̄ iff ∃Ic,d ⊆ Ia,b, Ic,d 6∈ V (p)
M, Ia,b |= ¬p iff ∀Ic,d ⊆ Ia,b, Ic,d 6∈ V (p)
M, Ia,b |= ¬p̄ iff ∀Ic,d ⊆ Ia,b, Ic,d ∈ V (p)
If we wish to remove the p̄ notation, we can do so by introducing a hybrid
operator Ix,y:18
M |= Ia,b p iff M, Ia,b |= p
M |= Ia,b ¬p iff M, Ia,b |= p̄
M |= ¬ Ia,b p iff M, Ia,b |= ¬p
M |= ¬ Ia,b ¬p iff M, Ia,b |= ¬p̄
Introducing this operator is acceptable because the distinction between the two
types of negation only holds at the atomic level; at the level of more complex
17Note that doing so assumes that all agents using this model agree on which intervals
will count as “present”, “future”, and “past”. In the seventh sophism, Buridan discusses
what happens when this is not the case, when, e.g., Sortes sola hac hora huius diei prima
utatur tanquam praesente et Plato utatur tota die tanquam praesente [Buridan 1977, 119]
(“Socrates uses only that first hour of this day as the present, and Plato uses the whole day
as the present” [Buridan 2001, 948]).
18This operator should not be confused with the I operator introduced in [Øhrstrøm 1984],
which stands for ‘is’, not ‘interval’, and is intended to represent the verb in a subject predicate
sentence.
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formulas, the only type of negation is the standard negation. This is because
the propositional atoms in our language represent categorical propositions, that
is, sentences of the form ‘Subject is predicate’, such as ‘Antichrist exists’ or
‘Socrates is sitting’. The internal structure of categorical propositions allows us
to make the distinction between ‘It is not the case that Socrates is non-sitting’
and ‘It is the case that Socrates is non-sitting’. However, this distinction is one
that only makes sense at the atomic level; it cannot be extended in any natural
fashion to complex formulas. This means that extending the truth conditions
to cover boolean operations on arbitrary formulas is straightforward and can be
done in the expected fashion:
M, Ia,b |= ¬ϕ iff M, Ia,b 6|= ϕ
M, Ia,b |= ϕ ∧ ψ iff M, Ia,b |= ϕ and M, Ia,b |= ψ
The connectives ∨ and → are defined in the usual way.
As we discussed in §2, in Buridan’s logic, there are two ways we can speak
about the notions ‘past’, ‘present’, and ‘future’. We can take such expressions
to be absolute or relative. When we take the terms to be absolute, then future
and past are absolutely disjoint from the present, but when we taken them
relatively, then parts of the present can be future or past relative to other parts
of the present. We distinguish these by introducing the operators FR and PR,
and FA and PA, for the relative and absolute tenses, respectively.
We define FA and PA so that the present is not included in the scope:
M, Ia,b |= FA ϕ iff ∃Ic,d ∈ I(M), Ia,b / Ic,d and M, Ic,d |= ϕ
M, Ia,b |= PA ϕ iff ∃Ic,d ∈ I(M), Ic,d / Ia,b and M, Ic,d |= ϕ
These are the same as the 〈A〉 ‘after’ and 〈B〉 ‘before’ operators from [Halpern et al. 1991,
938].
The converse operations G and H are defined in the usual way as Gϕ :=
¬F¬ϕ and Hϕ := ¬P¬ϕ respectively. This corresponds to the following truth
conditions, for the absolute cases:
M, Ia,b |= GA ϕ iff ∀Ic,d ∈ I(M), if Ia,b / Ic,d, then M, Ic,d |= ϕ
M, Ia,b |= HA ϕ iff ∀Ic,d ∈ I(M), if Ic,d / Ia,b, then M, Ic,d |= ϕ
The truth conditions for Burgess’s Gϕ can, given the constraint on V discussed
in the previous section that Burgess requires, be rewritten so that they are
analogous to the above as follows:
M, Ia,b |= Gϕ iff ∀Ic,d, Ic,d ⊆ Ia,b if Ic,d / Ie,f then M, Ie,f |= ϕ
From this it is clear that Buridan’s temporal operators differ from Burgess’s by
removing the requirement that the right-hand condition hold for every subin-
terval of Ia,b. This is in keeping with Buridan’s existential view of truth in
an interval, as opposed to the modern view of truth in an interval, which is
universal.
Informally, Buridan’s definition of relative past and future means that Ia,b |=
PR ϕ if there is some subinterval Ic,d ⊆ Ia,b and some interval Ie,f / Ic,d such
that e < a and Ie,f |= ϕ. As Øhrstrøm notes [Øhrstrøm 1984, 215], the truth
conditions of the relative tense operators can be defined in terms of the absolute
ones:
M, Ia,b |= FR ϕ iff ∃Ic,d ⊂ Ia,b,M, Ic,d |= FA ϕ
M, Ia,b |= PR ϕ iff ∃Ic,d ⊂ Ia,b,M, Ic,d |= PA ϕ
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More interestingly, we can also define the truth conditions of the relative op-
erators in terms of 〈B̄〉 and 〈Ē〉, thus connecting Buridan’s logic with that of
HS:
M, Ia,b |= FR ϕ iff ∃Ic,d ⊂ Ia,b s.t. M, Ia,c 6|= π and M, Ic,d |= 〈B̄〉ϕ
M, Ia,b |= PR ϕ iff ∃Ic,d ⊂ Ia,b s.t. M, Id,b 6|= π and M, Ic,d |= 〈Ē〉ϕ
Proving that these definitions are equivalent is straightforward:
Theorem 5.1. Let Ia,b ∈ I(M) be arbitrary. Then there is an Ic,d ⊂ Ia,b,
M, Ic,d |= FA ϕ iff there is an Ig,h ⊂ Ia,b such that M, Ia,g 6|= π and M, Ig,h |=
〈B̄〉ϕ.
Proof. (⇒) Assume there is Ic,d ⊂ Ia,b,M, Ic,d |= FA ϕ. Since Ic,d |= FA ϕ, we
know that there is Ie,f . Ic,d such that Ie,f |= ϕ. Since Ic,d ⊂ Ia,b, either (1)
a 6= c or (2) b 6= d.
(1) Either d ≤ f or d = f . If d ≤ f , then the desired Ig,h is Ic,b. It is clear that
Ia,c 6|= π. If d < f , then Ic,b |= 〈B̄〉ϕ because Ic,f |= ϕ, since Ie,f ⊆ Ic,f
and b < f . If b = f , then pick some f ′ > f , then since Ic,f ⊂ Ic,f ′ , the
same argument holds with f ′ substituted for f .
(2) Either a ≤ c or a = c. If the former, then the case is as in (1). If a = c,
then the desired Ig,h is Id,b, with the argument continuing as in (1).
(⇐) Assume there is Ig,h ⊂ Ia,b such that M, Ia,g 6|= π and M, Ig,h |= 〈B̄〉ϕ.
This means that there is an f > h such that Ig, f |= ϕ. If Ig, f |= ϕ then there
is some Ic,d ⊆ Ig,f such that Ic,d |= ϕ. Either (1) g < c or (2) c = g.
(1) Our desired interval is Ia,g. Ia,g ⊂ Ia,b and since Ia,g / Ic,d and Ic,d |= ϕ,
Ia,g |= FA ϕ.
(2) Since our models are based on R, and hence are dense, pick some e such
that a < e < g; then our desired interval is Ia,e and the argument continues
as in (1).
The proof for P is equivalent.
Given these definitions, there are a number of features about Buridan’s anal-
ysis of temporal logic we can express. First, we can prove the following theorem:
Theorem 5.2. If there is Ia,b, Ic,d such that Ia,b |= ϕ and Ic,d |= ψ, then
Ia,d |= ϕ ∧ ψ.
Proof. Assume the antecedent. Now, observe that Ia,b ⊆ Ia,d and Ic,d ⊆ Ia,d,
hence, since Ia,b |= ϕ and Ic,d |= ψ it follows, by the definitions of Ia,d and ∧
that Ia,d |= ϕ ∧ ψ.
It follows as an easy corollary that sentences of the form Ia,b(ϕ ∧ ¬ϕ) can
be consistent in this logic.19 This corresponds to Buridan’s observation that
19There is an interesting parallel here between Buridan’s temporal logic and modern
paraconsistent logics (for an overview of paraconsistent logic, see, e.g., [Priest 2002] and
[Priest et al. 1989]). In paraconsistent logics the principle of explosion |= ϕ ∧ ¬ϕ → ψ is
not generally valid. In this temporal logic, the principle of explosion fails, but in a much
weaker way. While it is possible for |= ϕ∧¬ϕ to be true, the principle of explosion still holds
for claims of the form|= Ia,bϕ ∧ ¬Ia,bϕ.
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the expression ‘Socrates is sitting and Socrates is non-sitting’ is a consistent
expression.
Second, as we noted in §2, Buridan conceives of the past and the future
in both an absolute and a relative sense. He needs this distinction in order
to discuss sophisms arising from Aristotle’s observation in the Physics that ‘all
which is moved was moved previously’; he argues that this is false qua the
absolute past but is true qua the past relative to the interval designating the
present. We show formally how this can be the case. Let x be an object that
never existed before today. Suppose that x comes into being at time a and
ceases to be at time b, and that x moves at t = 12 (a + b). Let p denote the
sentence ‘x is moved’, and let the interval Ia,b range over a given day. Then
the formula Ia,b p→ PA p is false, since Ia,b |= p, but for all c, Ic,a 6|= p, since x
does not exist before Ia,b. However, as Buridan points out, if here we are using
the expression ‘was moved previously’ in the relative sense, then the sentence is
true:
Proof. Ia,b |= p implies that there is an Ic,b ∈ I(M) with c < a such that
Ic,b |= p, because Ic,t |= p and Ic,t ⊆ Ic,b, and hence Ia,b |= PR p.
6 Concluding remarks
Buridan’s approach to temporal logic is distinctive for a number of reasons.
Buridan’s treatment of time is innovative in that it is strongly influenced by
pragmatic considerations deriving from his attempts to analyze various tem-
poral sophisms in a interval-based setting. Formally, the logic is interesting;
because of the weakness of Buridan’s truth conditions, the ITL that arises from
Buridan’s analysis of time lies in an area of modern ITLs that has not been
widely explored.20 There is a simple structural symmetry between the system
developed here and the system HS, based in the inversion of the truth condi-
tions for truth and false sentences, which lays the basis for fruitful interaction
between Buridan’s temporal logic and HS in both directions. Looking from HS
to Buridan’s system, it should be not too difficult to extend the completeness
and complexity results for HS to Buridan’s logic. In the other direction, the
distinction between the relative and absolute tenses can be added to HS to
give this system a broader range of philosophical application. We hope to pur-
sue both of these strands in the future, along with the point raised in footnote
17, namely that different agents could use different intervals to count as “the
present”.
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